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Abstract
It is often objected that the Everett interpretation of QM cannot make
adequate sense of quantum probabilities, in one or both of two senses:
either it cannot make sense of probability at all, or cannot explain why
probability should be governed by the Born rule. David Deutsch has
attempted to meet these objections. He argues not only that rational
decision under uncertainty makes sense in the Everett interpretation, and
that under reasonable assumptions, the credences of a rational agent in
an Everett world should be constrained by the Born rule.
David Wallace has recently developed and defended Deutsch’s pro-
posal, and greatly clarified its conceptual basis. In this note I outline
some concerns about the Deutsch argument, as presented by Wallace,
and about related proposals by Hilary Greaves. In particular, I argue
that the argument is circular, at a crucial point.
1 Preamble
It is often objected that the Everett view of quantum theory cannot make ad-
equate sense of quantum probabilities, in one or both of two senses: either it
cannot make sense of probability at all, or cannot explain why probability should
be governed by the Born rule. David Deutsch (1999) has attempted to meet
these objections. He argues not only that rational decision under uncertainty (of
the kind traditionally associated with probability) makes sense in the Everett
interpretation; but also that under reasonable assumptions, the credences of a
rational agent in an Everett world should be constrained by the Born rule.
∗This note is prompted by several recent papers by David Wallace and Hilary Greaves. I
hope it will be clear to those who know those papers that while I focus, of course, on aspects
of Wallace’s and Greaves’s arguments that I find problematic, I am very much indebted to
their discussions throughout.
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In two recent papers (2003, 2005b), David Wallace has developed and de-
fended Deutsch’s proposal, and greatly clarified its conceptual basis. In this
note, however, I want to outline some concerns about the latest form of the
Deutsch-Wallace (DW) argument, and related matters. In particular, I want
to argue that the argument is circular, at a crucial point. Similar objections
have been raised to various other proposals to derive meaningful probabilities in
the Everett context. The present objection is related to reservations about the
DW argument expressed by Barnum et al (2000) and by Lewis (2003), though
I think it develops these reservations in a new and more forceful way.
Most of my concerns turn on a feature of the Everett view that Wallace
takes to be crucial to the DW argument. As he notes, the argument is based on
symmetry considerations. He argues that it is stronger than the usual kind of
symmetry-based attempts to derive probabilities, because the symmetry isn’t
broken by a single actual outcome (which, if one knew it, would trump the
symmetry-based probabilities as a guide to action). Here is Wallace’s own sum-
mary of the point from another paper:
I will not attempt to summarise these decision-theoretic proofs here,
since the details are somewhat involved, but the underlying princi-
ple is essentially that of symmetry: if there is a physical symmetry
between two possible outcomes there can be no reason to prefer
one to another. Such arguments have frequently been advanced in
non-quantum contexts but ultimately fall foul of the problem that
the symmetry is broken by one outcome rather than another actually
happening (leading to a requirement for probability to be introduced
explicitly at the level either of the initial conditions or of the dynam-
ics to select which one happens). They find their natural home –
and succeed! – in Everettian quantum mechanics, where all out-
comes occur and there is no breaking of the symmetry. (Wallace,
2005a, §3.6)
As I’ll explain below, I have two main concerns related to this feature of the
model. Together, they suggest that this supposed advantage is at best two-
edged: the source of the symmetry is also the source of the deepest reasons for
scepticism about the fate probability in the Everett interpretation.
I think that the concerns I am going to identify also create difficulties for
Hilary Greaves’s proposed interpretation of Everettian probabilities (Greaves
2004). However, I shall be relying on Greaves’s discussion and conclusions in
other ways. In particular, I follow Greaves in rejecting what Wallace refers to as
the Subjective-uncertainty (SU) viewpoint. Wallace characterises this viewpoint
as follows:
Given that what it is to have a future self is to be appropriately
related to a certain future person, and that in normal circumstances
I expect to become my future self, so also in Everettian splittings I
should expect to become one of my future selves. If there is more
than one of them I should be uncertain as to which I will become;
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furthermore, this subjective uncertainty is compatible with my total
knowledge of the wavefunction and its dynamics. (2005b, §2)
The arguments Greaves presents against this viewpoint seem to me to be con-
vincing, but for present purposes I shall simply presuppose that she is right.
Wallace himself considers the possibility that SU might have to be rejected – he
calls the alternative Objective-determinism (OD) – and my objections focus on
the version of the DW argument he takes to be relevant in that case.
2 First concern
A standard difficulty for symmetry-based probabilities is that different ways
of carving up the relevant space of possible outcomes may yield different sym-
metries and hence different probabilities. In the classical case, there’s scope
to argue that one particular carve-up is to be preferred, precisely because it
does yield assessments of probability that match the observed long(ish) run fre-
quencies. But that response is off the menu, in the Everett case, for the very
reason that’s supposed to constitute the advantage, viz., that there is no unique
outcome or observed frequency.
So the ‘multiple carve-up’ problem would seem to be serious, for the DW
argument, if other carve-ups were available. As Greaves (2004, §5.2) notes, one
other possibility might seem to be what she calls the “egalitarian” proposal,
which accords equal weight to all branches. In my view, Greaves is right about
the problem this alternative would pose, if it were a genuine alternative. For-
tunately for the DW argument, and as Greaves explains, it turns out not to be
a serious possibility, for reasons to do with decoherence and the approximate
nature of branches, amongst other things.1
Still, the lesson seems to be that the DW argument would have trouble with
the multiple carve-up problem, if egalitarianism about branches were a live
option – if we shifted to a model in which branches were more sharply defined,
as it were (and of some tractable cardinality, perhaps).
If this is correct, it also seems to imply that the DW argument has similar
trouble, if anyone can propose some reasonably elegant alternative to the Born
rule as a rule weighting branches. If there’s such alternative available, then it
can’t be true that it is uniquely rational to assign one’s credences according
to the Born rule – after all, the same symmetry argument, starting with the
alternative weights, would show that it is uniquely rational to use those weights,
instead.
In her survey of these issues, Greaves (2004) suggests that we might turn
this point around – with egalitarianism off the menu, the Born rule might be
the only non-trivial option available:
1As Wallace puts it, “The point . . . is not that there is no precise way to define the number
of descendants . . . . Rather, the point is that there is not even an approximate way to make
such a definition.” (Wallace, 2005b, §9; see also Greaves 2004, §5.3)
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The failure of Egalitarianism (section 5.2) raises an important ques-
tion: are there any coherent rationality strategies that are at all
plausible and that also violate the Born rule? If not, we may hope
to . . . defend the Born rule by sheer process of elimination. (2004,
§5.4.2)
Greaves goes on to argue that no reasonable alternative is available: “It does
seem that the only way we can come up with an [alternative] strategy is by brute
force: that is, by specifying a preference ordering over Acts on a case-by-case
basis, without appeal to any general governing rationale.”
On the face of it, however, there’s an easy way to produce such alternatives:
just use the weights provided by the Born rule itself, applied to a different
initial state vector. This could be done in a systematic way, apparently: we
could imagine someone – call her Heretic – whose rule was that you started
with the state vector |ψ〉, applied some given operator Ôdd, and then used the
Born rule on the resulting state vector |ψ′〉 = Ôdd |ψ〉.
This may sound like a trivial suggestion. After all (it might be objected), the
DW claim is only that if you know the initial state vector, then your rational
credences are uniquely constrained. Of course it follows that if we postulate a
different initial state vector, we’ll infer different rational credences.
But this misses the point of the objection. At the moment, what’s at issue
is the validity of the DW inference from a set of assumed weights to rational
credences. We’ve seen that inference is challenged by the possibility of ‘multiple
carve-ups’ – different ways of assigning weights to branches or sets of branches.
We repel one specific such challenge, by dismissing egalitarianism, but the DW
inference remains vulnerable to the general objection. And the present point
is that the QM formalism itself seems to generate alternative weightings ad
nauseum, simply by considering alternative initial states.2
2.1 The case against equivalence
In Wallace’s most recent development of the DW argument in (Wallace 2005b),
a principle he calls equivalence plays a crucial role. The objection outlined
2We might want to impose a minimal consistency constraint, to the effect that the same
branches receive non-zero weighting in the alternative state |ψ′〉 as in the original state |ψ〉.
Howard Barnum has pointed out to me that it isn’t possible to meet this constraint in a
perfectly general way. In an unpublished paper (Barnum, 1990) in which he considers a
similar “shuffling” of the state vector, he shows that there is no non-trivial mapping bOdd that
my Heretic could use which preserves the extremal properties – viz., that the weight attached
to a measurement result corresponding to an eigenvector orthogonal to the state must be zero,
and that attached to getting a result corresponding to an eigenvector proportional to the state
must be one. But Heretic could avoid this difficulty, presumably, by the simple expedient of
announcing that her alternative recipe applies only in the cases in which the measurement in
question is not extremal, in this sense, for either |ψ〉 or |ψ′〉. As we’ll see below, the question
is really in what sense it could be rational to be guided by one quantum state rather than
the other, in the Everett framework. To the extent that this is a serious issue, it seems bad
enough if it only “bites” in non-extremal cases.
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above appears to undermine the DW argument at precisely this point – in other
words, it undermines equivalence.
As Wallace explains (2005b, §6), ‘Equivalence has the form of a principle
of pure rationality: it dictates that any agent who does not regard equally-
weighted events as equally likely is in some sense being irrational.’ He offers
an argument for equivalence, which, as he stresses, makes essential use of the
Everett interpretation:
I wish to argue that the Everett interpretation necessarily plays a
central role in any such defence [of equivalence]: in other inter-
pretations, equivalence is not only unmotivated as a rationality
principle but is actually absurd.3
Why? Observe what equivalence actually claims: that if we
know that two events have the same weight, then we must regard
them as equally likely regardless of any other information we may
have about them. Put another way, if we wish to determine which
event to bet on and we are told that they have the same weight, we
will be uninterested in any other information about them.
But in any interpretation which does not involve branching —
that is, in any non-Everettian interpretation — there is a further
piece of information that cannot but be relevant to our choice:
namely, which event is actually going to happen? If in fact we know
that E rather than F will actually occur, of course we will bet on
E, regardless of the relative weights of the events. (Wallace 2005b,
§6)
Wallace’s central argument for equivalence goes as follows:
In fact, a very simple and direct justification of equivalence is
available. Consider, for simplicity, a Stern-Gerlach experiment . . . :
an atom is prepared in a superposition |+x〉 = 1√2 (|+z〉 + |−z〉)
and then measured along the z axis. According to the result of the
measurement, an agent receives some payoff. Ex hypothesi the agent
is indifferent per se to what goes on during the measurement process
and to what the actual outcome of the experiment is; all he cares
about is the payoff.
We now consider two possible games (that is, associations of
payoffs with outcomes):
Game 1: The agent receives the payoff iff the result is spin up.
Game 2: The agent receives the payoff iff the result is spin down.
3[Wallace’s footnote] In this section I confine my observations to those interpretations
of quantum mechanics which are in some sense “realist” and observer-independent (such as
collapse theories or hidden-variable theories). I will not consider interpretations (such as the
Copenhagen interpretation, or the recent variant defended by Fuchs and Peres 2000) which
take a more ‘operationalist’ approach to the quantum formalism. It is entirely possible, as has
been argued recently by Saunders (2003), that an approach based on Deutsch’s proof may be
useful in these interpretations.
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In each game, the weight of the branch where the agent receives the
payoff is 0.5; equivalence, in this context, is then the claim that
the agent is indifferent between games 1 and 2.
To see that this is indeed the case, we need to model the games
explicitly. Let |‘up’;reward〉 and |‘down’; no reward〉 be the quantum
states of the two branches on the assumption that game 1 was played:
that is, let the post-game global state4 if game 1 is played be
|ψ1〉 = 1√
2
(|‘up’;reward〉+ |‘down’; no reward〉). (1)
Similarly, if game 2 is played then the quantum state is
|ψ1〉 = 1√
2
(|‘down’;reward〉+ |‘up’; no reward〉). (2)
Why should an agent be indifferent between a physical process which
produces |ψ1〉 and one which produces |ψ2〉?
Well, recall that the agent is indifferent per se to the result of the
experiment. This being the case, he will not object if we erase that
result. Let |‘erased’,reward〉 indicate the state of the branch in which
the reward was given post-erasure and |‘erased’,no reward〉 the post-
erasure state of the no-reward branch. Then (game 1+erasure) leads
to the state
|ψ1;e〉 = 1√
2
(|‘erased’,reward〉+ |‘erased’,no reward〉) (3)
and (game 2+erasure) to the state
|ψ2;e〉 = 1√
2
(|‘erased’,reward〉+ |‘erased’,no reward〉) (4)
— that is, (game 1+erasure) and (game 2+erasure) lead to the same
state. If (game 1+erasure) and (game 2+erasure) are just different
ways of producing the same physical state — different ways, more-
over, which can be made to differ only over a period of a fraction
of a second, in which the agent has no interest — then the agent
should be indifferent between the two. Since he is also indifferent
to erasure, he is indifferent between games 1 and 2, as required by
equivalence. (Wallace 2005b, §9)
Against this background, consider our Heretic. Suppose for the sake of argu-
ment that while agreeing that the initial state of the atom is the superposition
|ψ〉 = |+x〉 = 1√2 (|+z〉 + |−z〉), she weights the branches for decision theory
4[Wallace’s footnote] More precisely: the global state relative to the pre-game agent: there
are of course all manner of other branches which are already effectively disconnected from the
agent’s branch.
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purposes as if it were |ψ′〉 = 1√
3
|+z〉 +
√
2√
3
|−z〉. (In other words, she assigns
subjective probabilities in the way that an Orthodox person would, following
Wallace’s principle equivalence, if the initial state were actually |ψ′〉.)
Clearly, Heretic will prefer Game 2 to Game 1, and will be (rightly) unmoved
by the consideration that once the chosen game is over, thanks to erasure, she
will be unable to tell whether it was actually Game 1 or Game 2 that was
played. In one sense, of course, she is equally happy to win by either path. But
she thinks she is twice as likely to win by Game 2 as by Game 1, so she should
not weight them equally, for decision purposes, contra equivalence.
This means that unless it has already been assumed, implicitly, that rational
choice is constrained by the Born rule, then it is perfectly possible to make sense
of someone who violates equivalence. At least, it is possible to do so modulo
the assumption that rational choice of this kind makes sense at all, in the Everett
context, but DW can hardly dispute that assumption, in this context.
To put it another way, the objection seems to establish the following: if
we assume that rational choice under uncertainty makes sense in the Everett
context, and don’t assume what we are trying to establish – viz., that rational
choice should be guided by probabilities derived from the Born rule – then it is
easy to make sense of a rational agent whose (symmetry-driven) credences differ
from those assigned by the Born rule, and violate equivalence.
So the multiple carve-up problem seems to be a real difficulty. It is no help
knowing the real initial state vector, because the symmetry argument that is
supposed to justify the Born rule is already undermined by the existence of
alternative carve-ups. What would be needed would be some primitive assump-
tion to the effect that carve-up given by the real state vector was privileged.
However, this seems to amount to assuming by fiat what the DW argument was
supposed to show.
In fact, the consequences may be even worse than this. If the DW argu-
ment worked, it would seem to establish not only the Born rule, but also, more
basically, the coherence of rational decision under uncertainty in the Everett
context. If the objection above is correct in claiming that the Born rule is
effectively assumed as a primitive, in the DW argument, then the effect isn’t
simply to undermine the claim to have derived the Born rule; it is to challenge
the coherence of rational decision in an Everett world, in a fairly precise sense.
What it challenges is the idea that there could be any rational basis for choos-
ing between the weights associated with alternative initial state vectors, as one’s
guide to such decisions.5
The upshot seems to be something like this: in the Everett context we can
make sense of a minimal coherence condition of the kind provided by Dutch
book argument – failing which, apparently, an agent can be made to be worse
off in all future branches.6 But there seems to be no basis for any rational
5At least within the scope of the variation permitted by the considerations noted in fn. 2
above.
6Though it is worth asking to what extent these arguments themselves depend on the
assumption that well-informed agents can make sense of choice of betting quotients, in the
Everett context.
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preference between credences beyond that – no reason for choosing one initial
state vector rather than another, as it were, if one’s weightings are to be given
by the Born rule.
If this is correct, then even the proposal to assume the Born rule as a prim-
itive (as recommended by Greaves 2004, for example) seems to be in trouble.
We have not been told what the content of such an assumption would be –
what difference it makes. It is no use saying that its content consists precisely
in the way that it guides our choices in cases of decision under uncertainty. The
point is that we haven’t been given any understanding of what difference those
choices make (within the circle of the alternatives permitted by coherence in the
minimal sense).
Another way to put this is to say that if the link between the quantum
amplitudes and decision probabilities is taken as primitive, then we lack an
sense as to how there could be a single, correct initial state vector, in a given
situation. It doesn’t seem to be helpful to say that this is simply a postulate
of the theory. When we have real frequencies of outcomes, we have some sense
of what correctness might mean. Here, the point is that this sense seems to
have gone missing. All possibilities seem to be on a par (extremal cases aside,
perhaps).
It is natural to think that if we are to find a solution to this problem, we will
need to look to the epistemology of the Everett model – at this point, surely,
we should hope to find something that will distinguish alternative hypotheses
about the initial state. My second concern, below, focusses on this issue. Before
coming to that, however, I want to raise another issue about Wallace’s argument
for equivalence.
2.2 Same-State Rational Indifference
As we have seen, Wallace’s argument for equivalence relies on an argument
which first appears in this passage:
[R]ecall that the agent is indifferent per se to the result of the ex-
periment. This being the case, he will not object if we erase that
result. Let |‘erased’,reward〉 indicate the state of the branch in which
the reward was given post-erasure and |‘erased’,no reward〉 the post-
erasure state of the no-reward branch. Then (game 1+erasure) leads
to the state
|ψ1;e〉 = 1√
2
(|‘erased’,reward〉+ |‘erased’,no reward〉) (5)
and (game 2+erasure) to the state
|ψ2;e〉 = 1√
2
(|‘erased’,reward〉+ |‘erased’,no reward〉) (6)
— that is, (game 1+erasure) and (game 2+erasure) lead to the same
state. If (game 1+erasure) and (game 2+erasure) are just different
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ways of producing the same physical state — different ways, more-
over, which can be made to differ only over a period of a fraction
of a second, in which the agent has no interest — then the agent
should be indifferent between the two. Since he is also indifferent
to erasure, he is indifferent between games 1 and 2, as required by
equivalence. (Wallace 2005b, §9)
Let’s focus on the principle appealed to in this passage, which we might formalise
as follows:
Same-State Rational Indifference (SSRI): A rational agent should be in-
different between two options that give rise to the same global state (rel-
ative to the pre-game agent).
In the previous subsection, we saw how our agent Heretic seemed to have
grounds for rejecting SSRI: believing she had a better chance of winning via
Game 2 than Game 1, she prefers Game 2, despite the fact that the two games
lead to (effectively) the same global final state. The point I want to make now
is that Heretic’s case illustrates a general reason why SSRI must be rejected, by
anyone who wants to make sense of (some analogue of) rational decision under
uncertainty, in an Everett world. If a rational agent’s pre-game preferences are
constrained by the global final state in this way, she is bound to be indifferent
between the possible (local, in-branch) outcomes of the game or measurement
in question, because all of them reflect the same global final state.
Thus SSRI ensures that once a bet – any bet! – has been made, a rational
agent is indifferent between the possible outcomes. This seems to be a reductio
of the attempt to apply the decision calculus, which relies on differential pref-
erences between outcomes – without differential preferences, betting behaviour
cannot track credences. As it stands, then, SSRI seems to be a “home-goal” for
the project of making sense of rational decision in the Everett context.
Does Wallace’s argument for equivalence actually require SSRI? The ob-
vious thought is that we might avoid it by arguing for the required indifference
between Game 1 and Game 2 not in terms of the equivalence of the global states
resulting from each game, but in terms of the pairwise equivalence of the two
possible outcomes of each game. Thus, modifying Wallace’s terminology in the
obvious way, we would argue that the agent should be indifferent between the
post-erasure winning outcomes of Game 1 and Game 2, viz., |‘erased’,reward〉1
and |‘erased’,reward〉2, respectively; and also between the corresponding losing
outcomes, |‘erased’,no reward〉1 and |‘erased’,no reward〉2, respectively.
At this point, we want to conclude that the agent should hence be indifferent
between Game 1 and Game 2. However, it seems obvious that this depends on
the very matter at issue: namely, whether the agent should assign equal weight,
for such decision purposes, to the two different measurement outcomes on which
success depends, in the two versions of the game.
In essence, then, it seems to me that Wallace’s argument seeks to avoid
circularity by moving to the “global” level; but that at that level it invokes a
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principle (SSRI) which defeats his general project of making sense of rational
decision under uncertainty in the Everett world.7
3 Second concern
As I noted above, it is natural to think that if we are to find a solution of what I
termed the multiple carve-up problem, we will need to look to the epistemology
of the Everett model. It is at this point that we might hope to find something
to distinguish alternative hypotheses about the initial state. But this brings me
to my second concern.
Suppose I accept the Everett model. Whatever outcome of a quantum mea-
surement I observe in “my” branch, I should believe that each of the other
possible outcomes has occurred in some other branch. In other words, I should
take it that what I have observed is only one part or aspect of the overall out-
come of the process in question. Doesn’t the principle of total evidence require
me to take that into account, at this point? If so, then – in the absence of any
further facts about relative frequencies of the various outcomes – there seems to
be no way in which the evidence can confirm any particular hypothesis about the
relative weights of the various branches. For the total evidence (in this sense)
is the same in all cases. (In a sense, this appeals to a kind of epistemological
analogue of SSI.)
It might be objected that this argument ignores something like my normal
entitlement to regard myself as typical – this entitlement, the objector would
say, enables me to infer something further about the total evidence, viz., that it
is likely to be similar to the evidence I actually have. But the notion of typicality
rests on frequency comparisons. If such comparisons don’t make sense in the
Everett world, as Wallace and Greaves maintain, this response seems to be off
the agenda.
3.1 Greaves on Everettian epistemology
Greaves herself offers a defence of the epistemology of the Everett model. Her
argument is based on the distinctive interpretation she proposes of the Born
probabilities, as the weightings that a rational agent should give to the interests
of each of her multiple descendants in an Everett world – as she puts it, the
Born probabilities provide a “caring measure”.
On the face of it, this proposal encounters the difficulty identified above: if
the practical significance of the state vector is to be linked to a caring measure in
this way, we are entitled to ask what it means for one particular state to be the
“correct” state – how does the ontology of the Everett picture make caring mea-
sure better than another. (Again, a single-history ontology has some prospect
of an answer in terms of actual frequencies, but that option isn’t available here.)
Greaves’s proposal, in effect, is that we can get the constraint we need from
epistemology. She argues that the “caring” framework provides a close analogue
7This doesn’t imply that the SSRI isn’t defensible, in the Everett context, of course.
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of conditionalisation, sufficient to ensure we have good reason to afford high
credence to the conventional quantum state ascriptions, given the abundance
of experimental evidence already accumulated. In her own words, she proposes
that “a fairly strong case can be made for the following philosophical conjecture:
If the rational Everettian cares about her future successors in propor-
tion to their relative amplitude-squared measures, then (given our
actual experimental data) she should regard (Everettian) quantum
mechanics as empirically confirmed.” (2004, §2.3)
If this argument were successful, it would represent progress. It would provide
an epistemological sense in which a particular initial quantum state might rea-
sonably be privileged – regarded as distinctively “correct” – by observers in our
situation. With that sense in place, it might be argued that the Orthodox pro-
posal to base one’s decision probabilities (or caring measure) on this preferred
state (via the Born rule), was at least simpler than Heretic’s proposal to begin
with a different initial state (systematically derived from the “correct” initial
state).
However, there seem to be two major difficulties with Greaves’s proposal.
The first, which turns on the consideration at the beginning of this section, she
seems to anticipate herself:
In particular, it is worrying that the Dutch Book argument [for con-
ditionalisation] has nothing to say against an agent who insists that
the observation of A or ¬A is irrelevant to his belief in the theory,
and hence that he will retain his old degrees of belief . . . . (2004,
§2.3)
The agent Greaves has in mind here is someone who does not change his mind
as evidence accumulates, because he insists that it tells him nothing new. He
observes A, reasons that ¬A has occurred in the other branch, and concludes
that the total state of the world is exactly what he predicted it would be,
with certainty, before the experiment. Since this reasoning is insensitive to the
weight he ascribes to A, his observations cannot bear on that matter – in other
words, they are insensitive to his choice of initial state. If the suggestion at
the beginning of this section about the role of the principle of total evidence is
correct, this is precisely the kind of agent we ought to be. If so, then from an
Everettian point of view, our accumulated experimental data tells us very little
about the “true” quantum state.
The second difficulty with Greaves’s proposal emerges in the light of the
structure of the argument in this note. In effect, our first concern, in §2, offered a
sceptical conclusion about decision-theoretic reasoning in an Everett world. We
argued that from a decision-theoretic point of view, the Everett model provides
no sense in which – if we do allow our decision probabilities (or caring measure)
to be guided by the Born rule – we could think that one of a range of initial
states was any better than another, as the input to the Born rule. A sceptic
in the grip of this conclusion lacks any sense of what it means for a particular
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choice of betting quotients to be “right”, or “appropriate”, over and above the
minimal consistency constraints required for coherence.
The hope was to alleviate the sceptic’s decision-theoretic “nihilism” by ap-
pealing to the epistemology of the Everett interpretation. By Greaves’s path,
however, the relevant epistemology depends squarely on the decision theory.
The defence of conditionalisation depends on a Dutch Book argument, just as
it does in the classical case; but the Dutch Book argument cannot get off the
ground, unless the agent concerned can be assumed to have betting quotients.
It is not clear that that’s true, of our sceptic.
Thus the structure of the second difficulty for Greaves’s proposal is as follows:
in the present context, we need to make sense of the epistemology of the Everett
view, to provide a necessary foundation for its decision theory. But Greaves’s
route to the epistemology depends on a decision-theoretic argument. Hence it
seems inadmissable, as a solution to the sceptical difficulty identified in §2.
4 Conclusion
The two concerns above are related, apparently, because both stem from the
feature that Wallace identifies as the source of the unique power of the appeal to
symmetry in the Everett case, viz., that there is no unique outcome to spoil the
symmetry. In both cases, the objection is that in the absence of frequencies, that
feature inevitably severs the link between weights and outcomes, and puts all of
a wide class of assignments of weights on a par (predictively, for the purposes
of action, in the first case; and retrodictively, for the purpose of epistemology
and confirmation, in the second).
To give the penultimate word to Greaves herself,
the worry is this: it may be that if . . . we decide to understand
quantum mechanics along Everettian lines, . . . we lose the empirical
reason we had for believing quantum mechanics in the first place.
(2004, §2.2)
I’ve argued that this worry is more serious than Wallace or Greaves realise.
In the version of Everett to which they both subscribe, in which there are no
helpful facts about relative frequencies of branches, the internal symmetries of
quantum mechanics generate a fatal indeterminacy. The central ontological fact
of the Everett world, viz., the identity of the quantum state itself, seems to lose
practical and empirical significance, within wide margins.8
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